Washington, DC 20005

Suite 900

25

```
1
      FOR THE INTERESTED
      PARTY, CANAAN EQUITY
      OFFSHORE CV:
 2
 3
                             JAMES R. OSWALD, ESQ.
                             Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C.
                             One Citizens Plaza, 8th Floor
 4
                             Providence, RI 02903
 5
 6
      Court Reporter:
                            Debra D. Lajoie, RPR, FCRR, CRI
 7
                Proceeding reported and produced by computer-aided
 8
                                     stenography
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1 4 APRIL 2008--2:08 P.M. THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. 2 We have here today Naval Officers from some 34 or 3 35 nations who are studying at the Naval War College, 4 5 studying the American Governmental system, taking a look at the Federal Judicial system. They've traveled all over the 6 7 country looking at various things, and they are not only 8 studying how to make war, but how to make peace. And so they're observing today, after I've given them a lecture on 9 10 the American Judicial system, the proceedings here today. The case before the Court is the Estate of 11 12 Yaron Ungar, et al, vs. The Palestinian Authority, et al. It is Civil Action No. 00-105L. And the matter is here on 1.3 14 Defendant's motion for relief from a default judgment 15 entered some three and a half years ago. Will the attorneys identify themselves for the 16 17 record, please. 1.8 MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the Plaintiffs. 19 MR. ROCHON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 20 Mark Rochon on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and the 21 PLO. 22 MR. HIBEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 23 Richard Hibey for the Defendants. 24 MR. SHERMAN: Deming Sherman for the Defendants. 25 THE COURT: All right. Who will argue on

Defendants' side?

MR. ROCHON: I will, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rochon, you may proceed.

MR. ROCHON: Thank you. Good afternoon,

As indicated, my name is Mark Rochon. I'm with the law firm Miller & Chevalier in Washington, D.C. The first thing I'd like to do is— of course I haven't been in front of the Court before, and thank you for granting our admission pro hac vice in this matter so that I can be heard before you today.

We are here on Defendants' motion to vacate a default judgment. And, as we've indicated in our papers, I hope we've conveyed to the Court that we do understand the extraordinary nature of the relief we request, the procedural history inflicted on this case by our clients in connection with the entry of the default judgment.

And I'm going to proceed this afternoon, if I may, by doing something that is not usually recommended in the oral advocacy handbooks, which is to start with what is apparently perceived to be our weakest arguments, instead of what we believe to be our strongest arguments.

Therefore, I will not reach the issues of meritorious defense until I attempt to address some of the

2.0

other issues that are raised by the Plaintiffs in suggestion that the Court ought not even reach the question of meritorious defenses in this case.

And let me start with the fundamental question of whether or not the default here was willful. And let me say to the Court that, after a moment or so, I'll get to what I believe are some nuanced aspects of that question. But, fundamentally, Your Honor, we recognize in our pleadings and before you that it would be within the ambit of your discretion to find that it was a willful default.

So I've given that first answer. But I think it is important to note, after saying so, that the Court consider the circumstances as of the time of the default. And the parties agree that the relevant inquiry, the relevant time point for you to make that inquiry, is as of the default, not as to conduct subsequent to the default. In Footnote 2 of the Plaintiffs' objection to our motion, they note that, that is the relevant time frame for you to make that inquiry.

When the default -- and I distinguish between the default and the default judgment -- when the default was entered, it was entered -- recommended below by the Magistrate Judge even prior to the time that you had ruled on the issues of sovereign immunity, and you eventually ruled on the sovereign immunity and accepted the

recommendation as to default, as of that moment, the willfulness of the Defendants was not as culpable as it might otherwise have been.

And let me rush to say, Your Honor, I'm not suggesting that the Defendants would not have defaulted in light of subsequent events. The Defendants defaulted in other cases, even after you reached your decision as to sovereign immunity, that the Palestinian Authority is not sovereign.

But the law does say that you ought to look at the consciousness of the Defendants as of the time of the default, as of that very moment, the Defendants' culpability in regard to the procedural history of this case, and the entry of the default is not what it is sometimes portrayed to be by the Plaintiffs.

The real question as to the culpability of the Defendants in that regard goes, I think, more to the timing of the raising of the motion to vacate the default, as opposed to what the mental state was at that moment.

Having admitted that it would be within the ambit of your discretion to say that the default was willful, the next question that's raised by the Plaintiffs is they suggest that, therefore, that ends the inquiry, that this Court may not, in the exercise of its discretion, nonetheless, consider the other factors relevant to a motion

2.1

.22

to vacate under Rule 60(b). As to that, we disagree with the Plaintiffs. And, in fact, I think the First Circuit has indicated that it does not agree with the Plaintiffs.

The case law of this jurisdiction recognizes that, ordinarily, and I quote, "Willfulness is, by itself, dispositive." But by the very use of the word ordinarily, the First Circuit has allowed for a situation that would be extraordinary.

The Plaintiffs have argued before you that there's an entire series of cases and Supreme Court holdings that establish beyond any doubt whatsoever that willfulness alone ends the inquiry.

That cannot be so, as we have referred the Court to many cases where trial courts and appellate courts have found willfulness but then, nonetheless, vacated a default.

Indeed, the case upon which the Plaintiffs rely most strongly for the notion that you ought not even consider anything after a finding of willfulness is out of the 11th Circuit, and subsequent to that, they decided the Jackson case, upon which we have argued at some length in our pleadings, where the Court found a willful default but vacated it, nonetheless, as to China.

Recently, another Federal Judge, in the Knox case-and the Knox case is another case against the Defendants for

similar allegations in the Southern District of New York, and, on occasion, in your rulings in this case, you've noted similar rulings made by the Court in the Knox case.

Recently, Judge Marrero, in the Knox case, had to address the very question, is a willful default, by itself, an inquiry-ender, and concluded, in vacating a default judgment entered against the same Defendants as are before you today, that willfulness was not an inquiry-ender and went on to consider the extraordinary circumstances and the meritorious defenses in that case in ordering the vacator of a default judgment of \$192 million.

We would suggest to the Court that the inquiry by Judge Marrero, which I realize is not binding on you as a fellow United States District Court Judge in another jurisdiction, it is, hopefully, somewhat persuasive to you but certainly doesn't control the exercise of your discretion, but we think the analysis that is laid out there as to this legal point is the correct analysis. All of this is simply to say that it is within your discretion to consider the meritorious defenses and the extraordinary circumstances presented in this case.

The Plaintiffs have also argued, Your Honor, that we are precluded from raising this motion by virtue of the prior litigation in this Court and in the First Circuit.

They have argued that, in essence, prior rulings by you or

by the First Circuit preclude the Defendants from arguing a motion to vacate default whatsoever or, in the context of so arguing, raising meritorious defenses. On that point, we, again, disagree with the Plaintiffs on that question of law. There was not before the First Circuit any motion to vacate a judgment.

Judge Marrero addressed the same argument raised in the same way in his recent opinion and noted that the appellate, in that instance, terminated appellate litigation in the Second Circuit, had not involved a motion to vacate, that it would have been inapposite to raise the issues on that appeal that were raised by the motion to vacate.

Similarly, the issue of whether or not we have a meritorious defense was not litigated before the First Circuit. The question of whether or not you ought to vacate this default judgment was not litigated before the First Circuit. And your discretion is not circumscribed whatsoever in that regard in addressing this motion by the First Circuit opinion, given that we are not raising any issues in our motion that were litigated before the First Circuit.

The arguments by the Defendants before the First Circuit dealt with sovereign immunity. We're not claiming we're sovereign. It dealt with whether or not the amount of the judgment created a political question under the

Political Question Doctrine. We're not arguing that it does. They argued that you should not have entered default judgment prior to ruling upon sovereign immunity. We're certainly not arguing that point again here. In short, the efforts to preclude us from raising these arguments and these defenses fall short.

What I would suggest, Your Honor, therefore, is that the Court does need to reach the other factors under Rule 60(b)(6) in addressing this motion. And I'd like to move on to those other factors after first referencing in a slightly more extended way the recent Knox opinion, with which I assume that the Court is familiar. We brought it to the Court's attention last week, if the Court had not already, in its research, been made aware of it.

The Knox opinion addresses several points that are relevant here. The first I've mentioned, Is willfulness dispositive? No. Is litigation precluded? Also previously addressed. No. The question of the importance of merits litigation in a situation such as this is discussed extensively there. The question of prejudice in connection with the granting of a motion is discussed there. And the exceptional circumstances and the importance of foreign policy issues are all discussed there.

And the Court addressed those, even in the face of the United States not filing a formal suggestion of interest

in that case. They filed a letter with the Court expressing concern about the judgments and their potential impact on the viability of our client's continuing governance, but they did not file a formal suggestion of interest.

In his opinion, Judge Marrero noted the-- on the issue of prejudice, I want to turn to that because the Plaintiffs there argued that, because the Gaza Strip has been taken over by HAMAS, that they were prejudiced in their ability to defend the case, arguments that are similar to the ones that are raised before you now. We would suggest that careful analysis by this Court of those arguments would yield a result similar to that taken by Judge Marrero in the Knox case. So we recommend it to the Court, while we recognize that it is certainly not binding on you.

Your Honor, I'd like to turn, if I may, to the meritorious defenses that we have raised here, that the Plaintiffs have suggested do not warrant relief here and, after that, address what we believe are the additional extraordinary circumstances.

This is a case-- and the parties agree on a very few things in this case, but they agree that the killings here were committed by HAMAS terrorists. The parties agree there's a judgment against HAMAS for their actions issued by this Court for \$116 million. The parties agree that nothing we're asking you to do affects that judgment for what they

did.

1.8

The parties actually come close to agreeing that HAMAS did that to thwart the peace process in which the Palestinian Authority and the PLO were engaged in 1996. Certainly without regard to whether the Plaintiffs agree with that today, in connection with parallel litigation in the District of Columbia, they have presented extensive testimony and argued that HAMAS killed the Ungars to stop the peace process in which our clients were then engaged.

In fact, the historical record, including records relied on by the Plaintiffs, show that HAMAS engaged in a series of acts of terroristic violence to thwart that peace process. And, sadly, the evidence in the record is they succeeded, that, as a result of their actions, Israel took action to try to stop that activity. A Government was elected in Israel that pulled back from the peace process, and we're now 12 years later getting to about where they were in 1996 in regards to the peace process.

HAMAS, according to the Plaintiffs' experts, opposed what the PA and PLO were doing and, according to the testimony from the Plaintiffs' experts in Washington, D.C., went to Iran because it was the only place they could go to get support for their actions. They went there to stop the Defendants, at that time, from doing what we would like them to do and what their-- the process in which they're engaged

today.

That action of HAMAS continues to affect the peace process in connection with this judgment that has been entered against our clients. The Palestinian Authority and the PLO paying \$116 million to the very deserving Plaintiffs in this case for their losses will not assist the peace process. It will give HAMAS exactly, in essence, that which they were seeking to do, further destabilizing the PA and the PLO. The unfortunate reality of this case is that the meritorious defense that the PA and the PLO have was not adequately asserted, but it is critical that it be asserted.

Judge Marrero, in his opinion, also discussed the importance of issues like this receiving an airing in a public forum, a trial, because of the serious allegations that a governing entity, particularly one with which the United States is engaged in close diplomatic relationships moving towards peace, the allegation that they supported and were aiders and abetters of terrorism is a critical allegation that ought to be tried, if it can be, as opposed to being resolved without the benefit of litigation.

The PA and the PLO, as you know-- and this is partly for the benefit of our audience, I guess-- we don't seek to have this default judgment go away and have the PA and PLO walk out of here and not owe a dime or ever have to try this case. What we seek is the opportunity to have the

Plaintiffs prove their case and us have the opportunity to defend it.

We recognize that our clients did not pursue that adequately. That's why there's a default judgment against them. We recognize that, that litigation behavior that resulted in that is not the fault of the Plaintiffs. It is the responsibility of the Defendants, but there are extenuating circumstances that are relevant to evaluating that, Your Honor.

entity called the Palestinian Authority, does not have all the infrastructure of the governments of which we're familiar and maybe the governments of which so many others are familiar. It has been in a position of not achieving as much of an organizational structure as other governments. It does not— has not responded well to foreign litigation. It is not surprising that, at least at some point, they were surprised to be brought in to United States Courts for actions that occurred in the Middle East, in Israel, or Palestine or Jerusalem.

It is not surprising that, at first, they resisted the idea that, that matter would be brought here. But that is where it was brought, and that is where you ruled it belonged, and that's where the First Circuit ruled that it belonged, and we know that.

But the reality that they had initially a failure to contemplate that is also something that you should consider. The fact that they have been in disarray for a period of time is something that you should consider as you evaluate whether they're to be given the opportunity to defend or not. We've supplied information about the problems that, that government has faced, and we've supplied information about the potential impact of this judgment and others to the Court.

The Plaintiffs have argued that the impact of this judgment is not great, that it can be paid readily by this entity. They have suggested that the money is readily available, though the Secretary of State of the United States of America says we're tottering on bankruptcy. They have focused on the fact that people have committed to pledge money as if the money has been received. They have spoken about the Palestinian Authority and the PLO to suggest that somehow this was a willful failure to bring the defense to the attention of the Court in a timely manner.

And I would suggest to the Court that— and the Court is a sophisticated Court— that it's a very— as you stand here— as I stand here before you to argue on behalf of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority, that HAMAS committed the act of terror for which we're held liable now. It is, obviously, something that is politically, itself,

charged for our clients.

1.5

HAMAS is trying, according to what the United
States of America and its diplomatic communications says, is
trying to thwart our client and the Government from the
peace process. They are threatening the very
representatives that are speaking for peace.

In that context, to bring to the United States

Court and try those issues and to expect this kind of

governing entity, this kind of fledgling governing entity,

to just walk in to Court and present those defenses asks an

awful lot.

I'm going to present, if I have the chance, the defense that they killed the Ungars without involvement of my clients, but that is a complicated and difficult defense that is not just raised as if it's a-- some contract dispute. This is an extraordinary case, if ever there was one. It cries out for an extraordinary response by this Court to the motion to vacate.

I recognize that, that will require us to try the case. I emphasize that it doesn't free HAMAS for its responsibility and the judgment against HAMAS. And I point out that, as judgment is collected against the Palestinian Authority, it is reduced against HAMAS. They will get away scot-free if the Palestinian Authority pays this judgment.

Every million dollars that we pay is a million dollars they don't have to pay.

so where we are, 12 years after this terrible event, is HAMAS committed the act to thwart the peace process, succeeded in doing so, and now the enforcement of this judgment against our clients has the capability of letting them win again. In the opinion of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, it would be much more important and appropriate to try the case.

THE COURT: Well, if you have to pay this judgment, don't you have a right of contribution against the HAMAS?

MR. ROCHON: We would have a right, under the law, for contribution against HAMAS. It would be difficult for us. It's also difficult for the Plaintiffs. We recognize that. But if there is ever a seizure of funds going to HAMAS by the Israelis, we'll make efforts to interdict those funds, those funds could be given to the Ungars but not if the judgment is extinguished.

THE COURT: You have a right to indemnification, if what you say is true, complete indemnification under our law. I don't know what the law is out in Israel, but, under our law, you would have the right to complete indemnification, if what you say is true.

MR. ROCHON: If the Court-- an indemnification action, to the degree HAMAS would ever appear in Court to

defend it, the argument would be, of course, that we're late for that, as well.

THE COURT: A cause of action for indemnification doesn't arise until you've paid, you've paid the judgment. It hasn't accrued it. You pay this judgment, you've got a right of indemnification that accrues at that time.

MR. ROCON: Yes.

THE COURT: That's the law of here. I don't know what it is elsewhere.

MR. ROCHON: It is certainly undeniable that, as to the Plaintiffs' collections against HAMAS, they would end with the payment of the judgment by the PA and the PLO, and that would put the PA and the PLO litigating collection against HAMAS--

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. ROCHON: -- which, obviously, poses, in some ways, as many complications and more than any current effort to collect against HAMAS.

The reality, Judge, is that the reason that the collection efforts are focused on our clients instead of on HAMAS is because we are perceived to have the money, despite the fact that HAMAS engaged in the action, according to the Plaintiffs, with the assistance of Iran, not with the PA. And Iran was doing that to thwart the peace process. That's also the reality of the case.

THE COURT: I don't know about any of those factual assertions.

MR. ROCHON: Well, the factual assertions about the Plaintiffs saying that the-- that HAMAS did this with the assistance of Iran are taken from what the Plaintiffs alleged in Washington, D.C. They sued Iran on that theory.

So those allegations come from the Plaintiffs, not from me. They also come from me, but they originally come from the Plaintiffs.

The suggestion that they did that to thwart the peace process comes from me, but it comes from me quoting the Plaintiffs, that they did that because they couldn't get support from the PA or PLO so they went to Iran comes from the Plaintiffs' expert under oath in Washington, D.C., Reuvan Paz, and quoted in our brief. Those aren't-- that's not my client making those statements because we'd like it to be so. It's the Plaintiffs making those statements because they believe it to be so, and they'd be admissions.

The factual scenario of HAMAS's involvement and responsibility for this comes by full accord. The question in this case is whether or not the Plaintiffs would be able to establish before you that, despite the fact that HAMAS was doing this to thwart the process of peace in which our clients were engaged, that our clients, nonetheless, for some reason, aided and abetted that process and they came to

us for aiding and abetting of that process.

We would like to suggest to the Court, and we do suggest to the Court, that there is a tension between the theories advanced by the Plaintiffs before this Court and the District of Columbia.

THE COURT: There's no question that the-- there are factual issues as to whether the Palestinian Authority and the PLO would be liable in this case if the case were heard on the merits.

But that was an opportunity that your clients had a long time ago, to file an answer in this case and dispute these allegations and submit the discovery, and Yasser Arafat did not want to subject himself to a deposition, along with the other six or seven officials that were noted for depositions, and to make discovery.

He made a very deliberate choice not to defend this case on the merits and to put all his eggs in one basket, sovereign immunity. He made that decision, and it was reported right here in open Court by his counsel, Ramsey Clark.

It's right here in the record, my hearing in September, 2004. I stated, "I advised these Defendants a long time ago that the proper way to raise the defense of sovereign immunity was to file an answer and to raise the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity, and then I would

have a hearing on the matter. I would stay discovery until that matter was resolved."

Mr. Clark came in to Court and said unequivocally that Yasser Arafat did not want to file an answer in this case and did not want to defend this case on the merits.

MR. ROCHON: I certainly agree with your characterization of what Mr. Clark said and that, that was the strategy that, together with their counsel, Mr. Clark, that Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian Authority pursued.

That's why we're here on a motion to vacate default judgment. If it weren't for that kind of behavior, we wouldn't have a default judgment. Some of the other cases that we've cited involve Defendants being equally resistant to participating in the U.S. Court process but Courts, in the exercise of their discretion, granting motions to vacate default.

It is the case, Your Honor, that the Plaintiffs have suggested that they would be prejudiced from the inability to depose those people at this point. In our response to that, in our briefs, is, first of all, as to many of those individuals, the idea that they had evidence that would have been helpful to the Plaintiffs' case is purely speculative. But then, in addition, if there's a particular circumstance in which they're prejudiced, we can address that by way of conditions in connection with the

trial.

THE COURT: Arafat is dead. He can't be deposed, and he was the key witness. He could have subjected himself to a deposition and answered truthfully and refuted all these allegations that they were giving safe haven to the HAMAS and was supporting HAMAS and so forth. He could have fought this case, and he chose not to, for whatever reasons.

MR. ROCHON: The notion that he's the key witness I'm not as sure about, Your Honor. He could have said that he didn't support it, but the Plaintiffs would say, so it was some other person within the Palestinian Authority or the PLO who did it.

I can tell you the contemporaneous record, which is even better than what's speculated about what he might have said or would have said, for me to say what he would have said or Mr. Strachman to say what he would have said, it's uncontested that the Palestinian Authority arrested the—two of the individuals who were involved in this action shortly after it occurred, hardly consistent with desiring it to occur and aiding and abetting it.

HAMAS rioted when those individuals were turned over to the Israelis because they said that the very people that the Plaintiffs want to depose, Jibril Rajoub, they accused him of turning these people over to the Israelis for trial, and there was a riot in that regard, again, hardly

behavior that's consistent with us wanting this to be brought about.

2.0

That's as opposed me trying to tell you what

Yasser Arafat, who I never met, would have or would not have
said. I won't do that. But I can tell you the

contemporaneous factual record is that two of the people who
killed the Ungars were arrested by my client shortly
afterwards. That cries out against what you would normally
expect from a government that's accused of sponsoring

terror. If we had actively pursued this act, would we have
provided the perpetrators to the Israelis?

I apologize. I'm not supposed to ask you questions, Your Honor. That was inappropriate. It was a rhetorical question, but it's no--

THE COURT: It's all right.

MR. ROCHON: -- no way for me to argue to the Court.

THE COURT: I'm trying to get to the bottom of this, and what troubles me about this is that I can't think of a more willful, deliberate decision on the part of the President of the Palestinian Authority and the head of the PLO. He made that deliberate decision. He did not want to recognize the authority of this Court. I had decided that I had jurisdiction in this case, and, therefore, it was necessary at that time for the PA and the PLO to file an

answer, and they kept saying, "Sovereign immunity," so I told them, "File an answer, claim sovereign immunity. I'll stay any discovery that's outstanding, and I'll decide that issue, then you can make a decision as to where you want to go from there."

But he chose this route. So I can't think of a more deliberate, intentional act on his part, with the assistance of his counsel, a former Attorney General of the United States.

MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, all I can say in response is that it is the case that foreign governments sometimes do not fully appreciate the importance of these matters. When a foreign government is run by more or less a single person, there is even probably a graver danger that those decisions are reached in a way that is less than satisfactory, that when the new President of the Palestinian Authority wrote to the Secretary of State and asked for guidance in these cases, she recommended working with the U.S. Court system. He initiated the steps that resulted in new counsel entering the case, and we have been working to convey to Courts throughout the country that our client desires to have merits litigation to address these matters.

THE COURT: I understand your position, and I will make a determination, write an opinion in this case, make a determination of whether the equities are on your side to

have this judgment that's been in effect for more than three and a half years vacated and have a trial on the merits of this case.

MR. ROCHON: Yes, sir. Barring anything that I might say in reply, I only had two other things that I wish to say before sitting down.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROCHON: The first is, as we have indicated to the Court, we believe there are significant foreign policy issues here. We're aware the United States did not enter the Knox case. We, nonetheless, encourage you to seek the views of the United States of the foreign policy implications here. This matter's quite a bit different than Knox in terms of the role of HAMAS and the potential impact on the peace process. So we would ask the Court to do that. It's, obviously, another one of your discretionary calls.

Secondly, and unrelated, we have pending before you an effort for us to satisfy the judgment in the Bucheit matter, and I did assure Plaintiffs' counsel in that case I'd raise that in my argument with you to ask that in an effort to get that done, and now I've done so.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROCHON: Thank you, sir.

MR. STRACHMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Because of the numerous issues here, I'm going to rely, in

extensive and involve a lot of details and citations.

What is particularly salient to me here is a few facts that were omitted by the Defendants here. One, they have never represented to Your Honor, in their presentation today or in almost 100 pages of briefing, that they would comply with the judgment of this Court. And, in fact, the-they have never complied with the payment of any judgment that has entered against them.

So the Bucheit case, for instance, which is a million dollar judgment that they fully litigated for five-that is five years old, is only now being paid because it
was brought to the attention of the Judge in Knox that they
were not complying with judgments and yet seeking the equity
powers of the Court. I think that speaks volumes.

It speaks volumes here that, even now, even after their new attorneys allegedly were hired a year ago, they still haven't paid 20,000-- almost \$20,000 in attorneys' fees that were ordered by Judge Martin almost four years to the day ago.

They have not voluntarily made any payment in this case at all. And, in fact, as you know, we have been here for years in post-judgment collection proceedings with Your Honor, a creditor's bill, for instance, that we filed and that they have defended collection actions against us.

Your Honor's argument with respect to indemnification is right on the money because, during this litigation and prior to this litigation, HAMAS members were part of the governing coalition of the Palestinian Authority, and we brought all that to the Court's attention. There was a HAMAS minister in the Palestinian government.

They operate right now in the West Bank very openly, notoriously, they have banks, institutions, their own schools. The HAMAS is right there, and they could have sought, for the last four years, indemnification from the HAMAS, and they chose not to do that.

In fact, as the Court knows, what they did do, and as the Court is aware of this through a parallel proceeding, they have sued the Ungars several times, including in Palestine, including in Rhode Island, including in another Court, another Federal Court. So they have chosen just the opposite.

Also, I think what's-- what was missing is an excuse as to where they've been for the last year.

Allegedly they're taking instructions now from an economist by the name of Fayyad. Mr. Fayyad was the Finance Minister several years ago. He became the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority some time ago.

All of a sudden, now he claims that he has the portfolio of dealing with lawsuits. They waited almost a

year to file this motion to vacate. And, in fact, as we showed the Court in our exhibits, they strategically planned the filing of this motion after they informed the Court in Israel we were seeking collection actions, or we have a collection action pending, that they were specifically waiting to time this very motion because they were pleading with the State Department to come to their rescue, which, of course, has never happened.

The statement that the HAMAS has a separate interest from the PLO is simply inaccurate, and it simply includes a series of misstatements that we pointed out in our brief. Missing in their presentation is the quote from Dr. Paz, where he says the HAMAS gets weapons from the PA. They forget to tell you that. They forget to tell you that HAMAS people are employed by the PA. And, in fact, as we've showed in the exhibits that we filed here, the very leaders of the PA and PLO that we sought to depose have a direct connection with the HAMAS.

So, for instance, we asked to depose, and we were ordered, we were allowed to depose Razi Jabali. Well, at the time, he was the head of the PA police force. They don't have an army, so their police force is sort of the highest level of sort of military over there, if you will. They were ordered to produce him for a deposition here.

Lo and behold, a couple of years later, after they

have waited almost four years-- we're almost now four years since the judgment entered in this case-- Mr. Jabali, as we point out in our brief, is a senior advisor to the leader of HAMAS, protected in Syria. He works for the HAMAS himself,

Khaled Mashal. He's his advisor.

We asked to depose Mr. Dahlan. We were ordered and granted the right to depose Dahlan, and the Court gave repeated -- Judge Martin gave repeated opportunities and warnings that they had to produce these witnesses.

Mr. Dahlan, as we showed to the Court, and we brought a video to the Court in our recent filing, that in January of 20-- in January, 2006, Mr. Dahlan appeared on TV-- we showed the transcript and the actual video-- and where he says, "We sheltered HAMAS people."

Now, they misquote the statement, and they would have you believe that it was post the murder of the Ungars. But, in fact, that very statement refers to a master HAMAS terrorist by the name of Yihye Ayash, and Mr. Ayash, of course, they say, "We protected Mr. Ayash." Well, he was killed by the Israelis several months prior to the Ungar murder. So, clearly, Mr. Dahlan admitted, their own employees admitted that they were harboring and they were sheltering HAMAS people.

And that brings me to the issue of the prejudice that the Plaintiffs would suffer. The prejudice in this

case is overwhelming, and not only is it overwhelming because of time and because of the loss of witnesses, but this Court has already ruled that there would be prejudice to the Plaintiffs. The Court has already said that their actions in defying Judge Martin's orders and your orders with respect to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, requests for admissions, depositions, prejudices our ability to prove our case.

Now, they would have us rewind the clock, not just four years, but eight years, going back to March of 2000 when we filed this case. Since then, we know that, as Your Honor indicated, the very key witness, the person who himself pulls the strings of terrorism, who all the experts that we showed in our briefs, from the Israeli experts, the academic experts, the State Department, U.S. Congressmen, U.S. Senators, everyone up and down the line, to Secretary of State Rice herself, we showed her statement, all say the same thing, they all say that it was Arafat himself who turned on terrorism when he wanted and turned it off.

And what he did was he kept the HAMAS like a caged dog. And he knew they wanted terrorism, and they knew that at some times he wanted terrorism, so he used the HAMAS as a tool, and he opened the cage and unleashed the dog when he wanted an attack. Now, just because the dog wants to attack and the PLO wants to attack doesn't mean they necessarily

have the same goals and ideas, but they clearly want an attack, and that's what happened. That's what everybody said straight down the line from the Israelis, the academics, the State Department, Secretary of State Rice. And they don't deny that.

What they try to do is selectively quote from statements from Dr. Paz, leaving out the most salient ones, leaving out the statement where he says, "The HAMAS gets quns from the PA," for instance.

So now we have— they would have us be faced in a situation where we don't have Mr. Arafat, we don't have Gaza because all of the PLO and PA documents, their own documents, that are in Gaza were taken over by HAMAS, and they've acknowledged in another case, and we have showed and we provided their brief to Your Honor as an exhibit, where they acknowledge, We can't do discovery in Gaza. All the documents that we had— now, I'm paraphrasing, but all the documents that we had in our own PA police force, at our own operations in Gaza, are now gone.

And we allege repeatedly in our complaint that the support, material support and assistance provided by the PA and the PLO to the HAMAS includes actions that were taken in Gaza. So they would have us handicapped in that respect.

They would have us handicapped because Razi Jabali's hiding in Syria with the HAMAS, literally, as an advisor to them.

Mr. Dahlan is nowhere to be found.

2.2

Mr. Al-Hindi, another one of the witnesses that we were allowed to depose and they were ordered to produce and that we allege, like all of the witnesses, was personally involved in providing material support and assistance to the HAMAS. These aren't incidental witnesses. These are the crux of our case. These witnesses were the main witnesses. Lo and behold, Mr. Al-Hindi is no longer a PA employee, so he can't be produced. So the risk to us and the inability to litigate this case on the facts now, eight years after—they'd like to start all over again, like it was the day after we filed the complaint—is enormous.

Next, Your Honor, is the overwhelming risk that the PA and the PLO will hide their assets. We've shown the Court how they have fought us over \$196,000 in Washington. They have fought us in several places here in the United States regarding larger pots of money. They've fought us over \$11,000 with this judgment, in enforcing this judgment.

When Your Honor granted our creditor's bill and transferred to the Ungars the Palestine Investment Fund while their counsel was in the room, while they were present, within 90 days of that, they depleted \$27 million, as we've shown in our brief, in defiance of Your Honor's Court order.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, they have-- then they also, retroactively and deceptively, tried to amend the Articles of Incorporation. That was the subject of the other suit that was pending in this Court. I believe it was last spring Your Honor dismissed the -- where their purported lawyer sued the Ungars, and we showed in that case that they cooked the books, they cooked the documents, and I don't think it was any of the lawyers' fault. I think they were duped and misled themselves. So they are defying every order of the Court with respect to collection of judgments, as well.

And then we have, of course, the \$20,000 that they-- it's less than 20, I think it's like 18, 19,000 they were ordered four years ago to pay for discovery abuses, still hasn't been paid voluntarily. We have collected a small sum. We have had to go places to find assets. They have never voluntarily paid, and they still haven't paid that sum.

And, lastly, Your Honor, one of the most significant prejudices that we would suffer is that -- and they fail to acknowledge this, and it's surprising because, as their own website states, the PA is a temporary body, and Your Honor knows as well as anyone else, because you fleshed out all the Oslo Accords and all the documents that created the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Authority's legal name is called-- is the interim authority. The Oslo Accords

repeatedly refer to it as an interim, temporary body. By its own definition, it should have expired already.

In November, there was a conference in Annapolis, and the U.S. Government, the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority all committed to creating a Palestinian state by the year—by the end of this year that would supersede the PA, the PA would evaporate. And that's what they've said on their website. That's what the PA website, as we quoted in our brief, said specifically, that it will no longer exist.

So, therefore, a judgment that we might get years from now in this Court would be ephemeral because there would be no ability at all to collect it because the entity that we are suing would go away.

And, lastly, with respect to Your Honor's suggestion about or discussion about the strategy that they chose, one thing also missing from the Defendants' presentation is the selectivity that they have chosen with respect to litigation.

As this case was going on, exactly at the same time frame that this case was going on, and, in fact, we showed Judge Martin that they were litigating a parallel case in Washington, the Bucheit case in which they brought over witnesses, they had a trial, they appealed, they had separate counsel in Washington.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So they decided not just -- they decided specifically, knowing full well that there were certain opportunities that they wanted to exploit to defend cases, but there were others that they decided, for a lot of reasons -- and we know the reasons. One of the reasons is because they would be too embarrassed to bring all this evidence in Court but -- and to submit to depositions and have to answer questions. And, of course, they haven't answered a single question, responded to a single interrogatory, a single request for admission or provided a single document.

And glaringly missing from the Defendants' presentation today and in their 100 pages of briefs is the-is all that discovery. They've never provided that discovery. They still haven't provided discovery. And in the last year since, allegedly, this new-- the economist who was appointed to allegedly run their litigation office still hasn't provided any of that discovery or even offered to do any of the discovery that the Court ordered, even if it were permissible.

But the point that I was making is that they selectively chose to litigate the Bucheit case and to not litigate this case, and the statements that they made to Your Honor about personally meeting the -- when we look back at the transcript, the decisions of the Court, I think you

were, if anything, very generous to them.

Mr. Clark stood in Court and said, "I personally met with Yasser Arafat in his office in Ramallah, and he told me what to do." They later submitted a series of letters in this case and in other cases saying, We take this position. It's not a one-off position, it's not a mistake, and it's not deliberate just with respect to this case.

It's a global deliberate position that they had with respect to these cases.

So, for those reasons and the others that we allege-- that we argue, Your Honor, in our brief, I suggest that there's absolutely no basis for vacating this judgment. Their arguments are offensive not just to the Ungars but to the Court and to our judicial system, and to ask for a redo at this late date is in defiance of virtually all of the First Circuit decisions that we show and that we bring.

They are now asking this Court to import and to pretend that we're in New York and look at Second Circuit decisions, some of which were the decisions that the-Judge Marrero in the Knox case decided on, but I guess they didn't realize that we are in the First Circuit, and the First Circuit has very clear decisions with respect to the deliberateness, the issue of deliberateness in default judgments.

Thank you.

```
THE COURT: All right. How about freeing up those
funds to pay that judgment?
         MR. STRACHMAN: Your Honor, we had submitted a
response and a proposed order agreeing. What we objected to
was the nature of the original order and the attempt to sort
of undermine Your Honor's restraining order.
                                             We submitted a
response order, and I know now that the rules suggest we
should not be giving orders, but we wanted to give an order
because we have no objection if the Court signs our order
and those funds are provided to Bucheit. They deserve to be
paid, finally.
         THE COURT: Your proposed order and the proposed
order of the Defendants seem to me to be virtually the same.
         MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, I'll save Mr. Strachman
arguing. We don't oppose you signing his instead of ours,
if that's what he prefers.
         THE COURT: All right.
        MR. ROCHON: Our goal is to accomplish the payment.
         THE COURT: All right.
```

MR ROCHON: We're not interested in debating the

point.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1.2

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: All right. I will sign his proposed order.

MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'll take this matter under

```
1
      advisement.
               MR. ROCHON: Your Honor, may I have brief reply
 2
 3
      or--
               THE COURT: All right.
 4
               MR. ROCHON: Thank you, Your Honor.
 5
               THE COURT: Yes, go ahead. Make it very brief--
 6
 7
               MR. ROCHON: I will.
               THE COURT: -- because I've heard about everything
 8
 9
      I need to hear in this case.
               MR. ROCHON: Yes, sir. I understand.
10
               THE COURT: And I've done all the reading--
11
               MR. ROCHON: But, first, and I'll--
12
               THE COURT: And I'm going to write an opinion.
13
               MR. ROCHON: Thank you. -- I'll go through about
14
      five points. The suggestion that there's a separate
15
16
      attorneys' fees judgment in this case, if Mr. Strachman
      brings it to our attention, we'll try to address it.
17
               There was a sanctions order in Knox for attorney
18
      misconduct by predecessor counsel. Please let me tell you,
19
20
      that's been paid. If Mr. Strachman brings something
      involving attorney conduct, we will make arrangements for
21
      that to be satisfied.
22
               Second, the suggestion of where we have been for
23
      the last year, we got in this case in May. We knew when we
24
25
      filed vacator motions they would be read extremely carefully
```

by very capable counsel, and we didn't rush in-- these are complicated matters. There's 12 different cases that we had to analyze and file these motions in. The fact that it took us six and a half to seven months to get them all in, after we were fully engaged, you know, it was an extraordinary effort that we had to file these motions in.

On Mr. Paz's testimony about where these people get their guns, I object to counsel's reference, and let me bring the transcript up because the suggestion that we're playing fast and loose with the facts, Mr. Paz was asked by Mr. Strachman in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia where the terrorists in this case got their guns.

And on Page 78 of the transcript that we provided as Exhibit M, he, Mr. Strachman, elicited the testimony that the guns in this case were provided by Talachmeh, not from the Palestinian Authority, a HAMAS figure who trained the shooters who killed the Ungars.

Later in that man's testimony, he asked,

Generally, where does HAMAS get the guns, not as to this

incident, but just in general? And he said they'd get them

from a variety of places and suggested they get them from

the PA, not because they're given; they steal guns. And

that's at Page 80, same transcript.

As far as the First Circuit standards, Paul Revere

is the case that says that, ordinarily, willfulness is not dispositive. It's a-- I'm familiar with what Circuit I'm in. The Courts of this Circuit recognize that, ordinarily, willfulness is not dispositive. The Plaintiffs' counsel cited as many Second Circuit and 11th circuit cases as we have.

On the question of-- there was one other record reference I wanted to bring to your attention, Your Honor. The notion that our client is working secretly with HAMAS in 1996, that we're-- that they're a dog and we're a dog owner is all very colorful, but I'd suggest that the Court refer to the people who actually established the foreign policy for the United States in these matters, not Mr. Strachman, but the Department of State, which said, and I quote, "The Palestinian Authority"-- and this is on Page 27 of our original motion-- "The Palestinian Authority, which is responsible for security in the Gaza Strip and most West Bank towns continued, in 1996, its effort to reign in Palestinian violence aimed at undermining the peace process."

The fact that sometimes the dog of HAMAS was not controllable doesn't mean that we wanted it to be out of control. The State Department decides these issues, not the kind of representations from Congressmen on the floor of the House trying to, you know, get some votes from their

district for saying something that they think is going to be palatable. Foreign policy and the evaluation of our client comes from the Executive Branch in the State Department, not from Plaintiffs' counsel.

We would urge the Court to consider asking the State Department for their views as to whether our clients are dogs working with HAMAS or what is, in fact, the case, face assassination threats for trying to work towards peace.

Your Honor, the-- with that, and given what the Court has said, I would only add that, on any discovery, since we've come in the case, we actually are working with Plaintiff, and we've argued with courts in the District of Columbia to have reciprocal discovery in the cases down there. He's opposed it.

We worked with Mr. Strachman in this case to provide documents related to the British gas deal our client is engaged in so that, apparently, he could seek collection efforts in that regard. We, and I now refer to ourselves personally, have done what we can to comply with discovery orders since we've come in the case, and there certainly is no motion to compel discovery before this Court from Mr. Strachman.

Your Honor, we would ask the Court to recognize that, in fact, the Palestinian Authority ought to have the

25